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Locating inside the Salop circle: Demand
rotations in a micro-founded model1
Heski Bar-Isaac Guillermo Caruana Vicente Cuñat
New York University CEMFI London School of Economics
December, 2011
Abstract
We present a micro-founded model of design that leads to simple demand rotations. We
present simple su¢ cient conditions that determine when design should be extreme (fully stan-
dardized or fully tailored) or rather take intermediate positions.
1 Introduction
Firms constantly make decisions about pricing their goods, but also concerning the kind of goods to
produce. Even though some choices of product characteristics may be costless to the rm, they are
non-trivial decisions since making a product more attractive to some consumers may make it less
attractive to others. This leads to interesting strategic trade-o¤s between the pricing and design
decision.
The inuential paper by Johnson and Myatt (2006) on design starts exactly on this premise.2
They model design as a decision that rotates demand. The possible design choices lead to ordered
rotations. By focusing on a particular ordering of the possible demand curves, they show that
prots are quasi-convex in design so that design decisions are always extreme. They also provide
micro-foundations (based on information-provision and also choice of characteristics) that lead to
1We thank Mariano Irace for superb research assistance.
Contact info: Bar-Isaac: heski@nyu.edu; Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, NYU, 44 West 4th
street 7-73, NYC, NY 10012 USA; Caruana: caruana@cem.es; Casado del Alisal 5, 28014 Madrid, Spain; and Cuñat:
vicente.cunat@upf.edu; UPF, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain.
2See also Anderson and Renault (2006) and Lewis and Sappington (1994) among others.
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designs as a family of ordered demand-rotations with the appropriate property on the direction of
the ordering.
Here, we provide an intuitive micro-foundation in which demand rotations arise naturally. How-
ever, our approach is exible in that it provides conditions under which the demand curves that
arise follow the Johnson and Myatt (2006) ordering, or can lead to the opposite ordering. In ad-
dition, we show that although the direction of the order of rotation is a su¢ cient condition for
quasi-convexity of prots in design, it is not necessary. We provide simple su¢ cient conditions in
our framework for rotation ordering and therefore for quasi-convexity of prots in design.
While our model may be of independent interest, this is a useful contribution in the context of
some debate about the realism and generality on the ordering that is considered in Johnson and
Myatt (2006). In particular, Tirole and Weyl (2010) argue that quasi-convex prots may be more
the exception than the rule, and that thus the conditions in Johnson and Myatt must be restrictive.
In fact, Tirole and Weyl assume that prots are always maximized at an interior. In our setting we
can also provide conditions for when this is to be expected.
We introduce a framework where a monopolist decides on price and design. Design has two
components, one is a horizontal decision of which particular type of consumer to target, while the
other component captures the extent the product is specically tailored to this type of consumer
or is more broadly suitable for other types. Tailoring implies a trade-o¤ for the rm. Increased
tailoring implies a higher valuation by those consumers being targeted by the rm but a lower
valuation for those with di¤erent tastes. This is key to our analysis, and di¤erentiates us from
other studies that consider other strategic decisions that have a vertical avor, such as quality,
which is liked by all consumers.3
Specically, we build on the classic Salop (1979) circle model of product location, with consumers
uniformly distributed on the perimeter of a circle. Our point of departure is to allow the monopolist
to locate on the interior of the circle. While locating a product along an arc captures the usual
notion of horizontal di¤erentiation, locating it into the interior of the circle captures the idea
that the product is not as tailored as if it was further towards the perimeter. Accordingly, the
center of the circle corresponds to a fully standardized product which is equally valued by all
consumers. Assumptions about the travel costs along radials into the interior of the circle or along
3For instance, Ungern-Sternberg (1988) and Hendel and De Figueiredo (1997) study a strategic choice that they
refer as design, but which is a straight vertical quality decision.
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arcs characterize the ordering of di¤erent designs and determine whether or not prots are quasi-
convex in design, as we show in Section 3.
As an illustrative example, consider a software company introducing a graphic design applica-
tion. The rm needs to decide the kind of consumer-base it wants to target. The rm may target
artists, architects, engineers, industrial or graphic designers. The following diagram demonstrates
how our framework captures key trade-o¤s in the rms choice.
architects
engineers
industrial
designers
graphic
designers
artists
S
X
C
Illustrative product design choice for a developer of a
graphic tool
As an example, the rm could build a fully generic or standard software tool intended for all
tastes, labelled by S in the graph; a partially customized software for architects, such as X on the
graph; or a fully customized one C. Obviously architects most preferred product would be C. It
is also natural to assume that artists prefer product S to C; otherwise locating inside the circle is
irrelevant. Under these conditions, some consumers may also prefer C or S and some others will
prefer X. In such a setting, and depending on di¤erent aspects such as the intensity of preferences
of the di¤erent consumer types, their relative abundance etc., it may be very well the case that the
monopolist may choose any of the three designs. Our framework allows us to analyze such a choice.
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2 Model
Consider a ring of outer-radius 1 and inner-radius B with B > 0.4 Consider a mass of 2 consumers
uniformly distributed on the outer circle. There is a monopolist with a constant per unit marginal
cost mc, which can locate anywhere within the ring. If the rm locates right where a consumer
is, she values the product V . Otherwise, she needs to incur some travel costs in order to reach
the rm. She must rst travel along a radius towards the center of the ring and, only then, travel
along the arc.5 If she travels a distance y along the radius and x along the arc, the travel costs are
assumed to be c(y) + x with c0() > 0. That is, we assume linear unit travel costs along the arc,
but allow any increasing shape for the cost of travelling along an arc. This is all illustrated in the
gure below:
Consumer
Firm
Travel
distance 1-s
along radial at
cost c(1-s)
Travel along arc
at cost 1 per
unit distance
travelled
Fig 2: Design and consumer travel costs
Without loss of generality the rm is located at angle 0. Thus, the location decision boils down
to choosing how far inside the ring it wants to be, which we capture by s 2 [B; 1]. Locating at s = 1
corresponds to a fully tailored design in which the rm aims for a niche consumer base. Similarly
s = B is the most general design possible. While still aiming to a particular type of consumer it
remains as broad as possible.
4The software example presented in the introduction would correspond to a B = 0: For minor technical reasons,
the algebra in this paper is written for B > 0: The results for the B = 0 case can be analyzed as the limit case as B
tends to 0:
5This particular ordering is easy endogenize if one assumes that the consumer can only travel along one of the
two dimensions at a given point in time.
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If a monopolists chooses a price p and a design s, the marginal consumers who are indi¤erent
between purchasing or not are located at angles x and  x, where x satises:
V   c(1  s)  sx  p = 0,
Thus, the demand for a monopoly who chooses price p and design s is:
q(p; s) = max(0;min(2;
2
s
(V   c (1  s)  p)))
3 Analysis
We consider the optimal design choice for a monopolist who can choose both design and price. For
simplicity, we assume that optimal choices lead to a demand that is interior (which holds if V is
su¢ ciently high).6 In this case the demand function simplies to:
q(p; s) =
2
s
(V   c (1  s)  p)
and the monopolists problem is to choose s and p in order to maximize:
(p; s) =
2
s
[V   c(1  s)  p] (p mc): (1)
Note rst that the (inverse) demand function q(p; s) is linear and that, the higher s, i.e. the
nichier the design, the steeper the slope of demand and the higher the intercept with the price axis
. Thus, any two designs result in demands that cross only once (rotation point). As a result the
family of demands for di¤erent designs constitute a family of rotations according to Denition 1 in
Johnson and Myatt (2006). Further, Johnson and Myatt show (Proposition 1) that imposing that
the rotation price decreases with s is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee an extreme optimal design
decision. This allows us to prove the following:
Proposition 1 The rotation price is decreasing with s if and only if the cost of travelling along a
radial c() is concave. As a consequence, if c() is concave the rm optimally chooses an extremal
design.
6The same qualitative results are obtained for the case in which it is optimal to serve the whole circle.
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Proof. Let pij denote the price at the rotation point between designs i and j: By denition of a
rotation point, at price pij demands with designs i and j have to be equal. Thus,
2
i
[V   c (1  i)  pij ] = 2
j
[V   c (1  j)  pij ]) pij = V (i  j)  ic (1  j) + jc (1  i)
i  j
Now, consider any three designs x > y > z. The ordering condition requires that price is
decreasing in s,that is, pyz > pxy, which, using the expression above, implies that
V (y   z)  yc (1  z) + zc (1  y)
y   z >
V (x  y)  xc (1  y) + yc (1  x)
x  y ,
(x  z)c (1  y)  (y   z) c(1  x)  (x  y) c (1  z) > 0,
c (1  y) > +(y   z)
(x  z)c(1  x) +
(x  y)
(x  z)c (1  z)
Given that y 2 (z; x) there exists a t 2 (0; 1) such that y = tx+ (1  t)z: Thus, we can rewrite the
previous expression as
c(t(1  x) + (1  t)(1  y)) > tc(1  x) + (1  t)c(1  z)
which is the condition for c(:) to be concave.
We provide some intuition for this result. Consider the di¤erent demand curves that are traced
out as the monopolist chooses di¤erent designs. A concave travel cost c() ensures that as, the
monopolist moves from niche designs that induce steep demand functions to atter broad designs
the drop-o¤ in the price intercept is not too severe. In particular, the upper envelope of what can
be achieve by the family of demand rotations is traced out be the most niche and the most broad
designs. Thus, the monopolist chooses one of these two designs.
Note that the converse to Proposition 1 is not true. That is, if c() is convex, it is not guaranteed
that the optimal design is going to be an interior one. In order words, rm prots can be quasi-
convex in design even if the cost of travelling along a radial is convex. This can be easily perceived
by explicitly looking at the rst order conditions for the prot maximization program described in
(1).
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The rst order condition with respect to price, yields that at the optimum
p =
V   c(1  s) +mc
2
, (2)
and it is easily veried that the second order condition is satised. Substituting the optimal price
in (1) we obtain
(s) =
2
s

V   c(1  s) mc
2
2
(3)
and writing the rst order condition with respect to the design s; yields:
c0(1  s) = V   c(1  s
) mc
2s
. (4)
The second derivative of the rms objective function (3) with respect to s is given by:
(V   c(1  s) mc)2
s3
  V   c(1  s) mc
s2
c0(1 s)  V   c(1  s) mc
s
c00(1 s)+ (c
0(1  s))2
s
(5)
At the singular point, we can substitute for c0(1  s) from (4) to rewrite the second order condition
as
 V   c(1  s
) mc
s
c00(1  s) + (V   c(1  s
) mc)2
4(s)3
. (6)
Since, at a maximal price, the price must be above the marginal cost then V c(1 s
) mc
2 > 0, it is
straight-forward that a concave c() ensures a positive second order condition and, thus, an extreme
optimal design. Note also that a slightly convex c() would also deliver extreme design decisions.
However, the condition suggests that if the cost c(:) is su¢ ciently convex then an interior optimal
design should be expected. In terms of the upper-envelope of the induced demand curves, assum-
ing strictly convex costs c() implies that each design contributes a point on the upper envelope.
Whether or not an intermediate design is optimal, depends on how fast the price-interceptfalls.
If radial transport costs are su¢ ciently convex, the fall is rapid enough to ensure an intermediate
optimal design.
In general, (6) may not be trivial to verify especially since it relies on determining the solution
to (4). We can, however, establish more elementary conditions that are su¢ cient to guarantee that
an interior design is optimal.
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Proposition 2 An interior optimal design arises if
2Bc0(1 B) + c(1 B) > V  mc > 2c0(0)
Proof. The rm necessarily prefers an interior solution if the objective function (3) satises 0(1) <
0 and 0(B) > 0. Given that
0(s) =   (V   c(1  s) mc)
2
2s2
+
c0(1  s)
s
(V   c(1  s) mc)
we have that
0(1) < 0, V  mc > 2c0(0)
0(B) > 0, 2Bc0(1 B) + c(1 B) > V  mc
which concludes the proof.
Essentially, in order for a solution to be interior one needs that the cost function c(:) to be
su¢ ciently at at y = 0 and steep enough at y = 1   B. While these two conditions may not be
always satised, they are interesting for two reasons. First, they are simple to check and interpret,
and second, they do not impose any particular functional behavior in the interior of the domain, in
particular whether the function needs to be concave or convex.
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